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responding to Petitioner's arguments set forth in her capacity as Cross-Appellant.
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Summary of Arguments1
Respondent is entitled to the separate property he was gifted during the course of
marriage. It is undisputed that the five parcels of land at issue here (the "Subject
Properties") were paid for by Respondent's mother and given to him as a gift. Thus, the
district court incorrectly determined that the Subject Properties were not really a gift, but
considered earnings. Indeed, there was no factual or legal basis for any of the
conclusions the district court relied upon to label and divide the Subject Properties as
marital.
In regard to Petitioner's Cross-Appeal, Petitioner has set forth no basis whatsoever
to overturn the district court's rulings relating to Respondent's gifted LLC interest or the
disposition of certain bulls. Petitioner has inadequately briefed these issues, and in any
event, offers no reason for reversal. In addition, Petitioner sets forth no basis for
disturbing the manner in which the district court divided the Subject Properties, though
Respondent respectfully urges that this issue should be rendered moot by reversal of the
determination that the Subject Properties were marital assets in the first place.

1

In the Brief of Appellee, pp. 7-12, Petitioner sets forth a purported "Factual Background."
Respondent objects to the same to the extent: (1) it relies upon facts not in evidence at trial in this
matter, to wit, the affidavit Petitioner filed in response to a motion for summary judgment, see
Brief of Appellee, p. 4; and (2) contains argument rather than factual statements. Respondent
concurs with Petitioner's "Factual Background" to the extent it sets forth thefiveparcels of
property at issue in this appeal (the "Subject Properties"), all of which were purchased with fiinds
provided by Bernice Kunzler for the Respondent, and the district court's determinations
regarding the Subject Property and other assets. Respondent otherwise relies on the
"Background" statement set forth in his opening brief. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-4.
4

ARGUMENT
A.
I.

RESPONDENT'S APPEAL.
The District Court Improperly Divided the Subject Properties.

Respondent's appeal focuses solely on the district court's decision to treat the
Subject Properties as marital property and divide them accordingly. At this stage of the
briefing, it appears sensible to review the points on which the parties agree, and then
analyze where they diverge.
The parties agree that the Subject Properties were purchased with funds provided
by Bernice Kunzler, Respondent's mother ("Bernice"), and were titled in Respondent's
name, either alone or with certain siblings. See Brief of Appellee, p. 9; R. 1349-54
("Amended Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law").

During

Respondent's case in chief at trial, Bernice testified specifically that, as part of her estate
planning, she had paid for each of the Subject Properties transferred to her various
children. See TT2, pp. 71-72. In addition, Bernice testified at trial regarding her intent to
gift the Subject Properties to Respondent, and not Petitioner:
Q. Mrs. Rous [Kunzler], have you ever transferred interest in any property
or deeded any property to spouses of your children?
A. I have not.
Q. And why not?
A. Because this is something Chet [her husband] and I built. We built it
5

for our children. We intend it to stay with our children.
M , p . 73.
It is from this point that the parties' perspectives diverge. Respondent argues that,
based on these facts, the district court erred when it determined that the Subject Properties
were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the marriage." R. 1355 ("Amended
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law"). Petitioner argues that the
district court's decision was based upon sufficient record evidence to withstand appellate
review. Utah law regarding the division of separate and marital property indicates that
Respondent's argument should prevail.
While "[a] trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in
a divorce proceeding," Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, \ 17,45 P.3d 176 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original), its property "distribution must
be based upon adequate factual findings and must be in accordance with the standards set
by this state's appellate courts," Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
In this case, the Court begins with the premise that "trial courts making 'equitable'
property division pursuant to [Utah Code] section 30-3-5 should...generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage...to that
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value." Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988); see also Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App

6

373,If 26, 993 P.2d 887, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) ("Generally, in a divorce
proceeding each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and
fifty percent of the marital property." (internal quotations and citation omitted));
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah Ct. App.1994) ( "[E]ach party should, in
general, receive the real and personal property he or she brought to the marriage or
inherited during the marriage." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
As an exception to this general rule, it is recognized that premarital property loses
its separate identity and becomes part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by
his or her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges." Oliekan v. Oliekan,
2006 UT App 405, If 20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308).
This Court has also recognized that the presumption regarding separate property
"does not supersede the trial court's broad equitable power to distribute marital property."
Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, \ 26, 993 P.2d 887, cert denied, 4 P.3d 1289
(Utah 2000). However, as this Court recently observed in Hodge v. Hodge, 2007 UT App
394 (mem.), "there is an order to this process'" id. at f 5 (emphasis added):
In distributing property in a contested divorce proceeding, "the court should
first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or
as the separate property of one or the other." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,
1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added). The court should then
recognize the presumption that "[e]ach party is ... entitled to all of his or her
separate property and fifty percent of the marital property." Id. The court
7

may, however, then deviate from the presumptive rule if it finds and
articulates "exceptional circumstances" warranting such a departure. Id.
Trial courts must follow this "systematic approach" when making property
division determinations. Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, If 24, 9 P.3d
171.
Id. (emphasis in original). In Hodge, the district court "essentially skipped the first two
steps prescribed by Burt and Kelley." Id. at If 6. In this case, it appears that these steps
were ignored in their entirety.
There is no dispute that the Subject Properties were purchased solely with nonmarital funds and were titled in Respondent's name, along with his siblings. There is also
no dispute that Bernice intended the Subject Properties to be a gift to Respondent and his
siblings. See Brief of Appellee, p. 20 ("when purchasing the [Subject Properties] Alan
Kunzler fs mother intended [the properties] to be gifts and/or inheritance and that Allison
Kunzler receive nothing.")

Accordingly, such property should have been initially

classified as Respondent's separate property. See Hodge, 2007 UT App 394 at ^f 5; see
also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-35 (Utah 1987) (holding that real property
inherited by wife was separate property, subject to distribution exceptions recognized
under Utah law); Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 305-09 (describing gift of shares in farm
corporation as separate property, though subject to equitable distribution in discrete
cases); Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (mem.) (upholding district court
determination that real property purchased by non-marital assets and titled solely in wife's
name was separate property.).

8

Nevertheless, the district court ruled from the outset that the Subject Properties
were part of the marital estate. The basis for this determination is unclear. The only
findings related to this matter state, in relevant part:
The Court finds the money to purchase parcels of real property titled
in the name of Respondent came from income generated by Kunzler Ranch,
which at that time was Bemice Kunzler, dba Kunzler Ranch.
The Court finds prior to the creation of the Kunzler Ranch L.L.C. in
approximately 1996, Bernice Kunzler and the Kunzler Ranch were one and
the same entity and bank account.
The only income which the Kunzler Ranch generated following the
death of Bernice Kunzler's husband...was a result of the labor of
Respondent and his brothers. Respondent's mother testified that "Dean and
the daughters would receive less but that is because the boys on the ranch
have been there and have worked it." Additionally, Bernice Kunzler
testified, "These kids that live in town will not receive as much, they will
get benefits from their work, so that is why the boys on the ranch will
receive more."
The Court finds the daughters and son who have chosen to make
their careers in the city will have benefits from their employment including
40IK plans or pension/retirement plans. The only pension or retirement
which most farmers and ranchers have is the value of the land which they
have acquired. The Court therefore finds it makes sense that those who
have stayed and worked the ranch receive a greater share. The greater share
is not truly a gift, rather it is something that has been earned. The
Respondent touched briefly on this concept of gift vs. entitlement in his
own testimony. Specifically, the Respondent referred to a saddle which had
been given by him to one of the parties' sons and then Respondent corrected
himself and said, "It wasn't really even a gift, he had earned it."
The Court finds the interest which has been "earned" during the
marriage ought to be considered a marital asset just the same as any pension
which might be divisible under the Woodward formula.
R. 1347-48.
9

Based upon these findings, the district court made the following, ubiquitous
conclusion:
The Court finds all interests awarded to the Petitioner in the
foregoing paragraphs have been because the properties were either (a) not
gifts but entitlements earned during the marriage, or (b) acquired or
enhanced through the joint efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent, or ©
have been commingled.
R. 1355.
The only conclusion referenced in the district court's findings is the determination
that the Subject Properties were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the maniage."
Moreover, this was the only conclusion for which the district court cited any purported
support in the record. However, this conclusion has no support in the record.2
As set forth herein and in Respondent's opening brief, Bernice gave no testimony
at trial that the Subject Properties were "not gifts but entitlements earned during the
marriage." Rather, her testimony was to the contrary. Nevertheless, the district court
appears to have based its entire ruling that such property was marital on - at best - an
inference it apparently made from Bernice's testimony. This ruling should be reversed.

2

Petitioner raises the issue of marshaling in her appeal brief. Petitioner asserts that Respondent
failed to address her affidavit filed previously in response to a motion for summary judgment.
See Brief of Appellee, Addendum "A." The contents of this affidavit were not testified to by
Petitioner at trial Indeed, none of the allegations contained therein can be found in the
testimony she provided at trial; thus, such allegations were not subject to cross-examination.
Accordingly, Respondent has no duty to "marshal" such allegations, because they are not facts in
evidence at trial. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, % 11, 51 P.3d 724 ("in order to
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the veryfindingsthe appellant resists.") (emphasis added).
10

Bemice's direct testimony described her purchase of the Subject Properties, and
her intent regarding the transfer thereof. See TT2, pp. 71-73. She also made clear that
neither Respondent nor any of his siblings contributed any of their own money to said
purchases. See id. at p. 72, lines 22-25. On cross-examination, Petitioner's trial counsel
failed to refute or draw any conflicting testimony regarding these assertions. Instead,
counsel asked a number of essentially irrelevant questions regarding whether Bernice
thought her gifts were "fair." It is not even apparent that this line of questioning had
anything to do with the Subject Properties, but instead posed questions regarding the
LLC:
Q. Okay. The two LLC's that were formed, do you feel that that - that the
forming of those two LLC's were fair as far as treating your kids
equally?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. You do?
A. I do.
Q. Okay. Do you recall your deposition being taken?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And do you recall what you indicated on that occasion when I
asked you that question?
A. Yes. I think I told you that perhaps Dean, my son that lived in
Tremonton, and my daughters received less. But I take into account,
too, that my boys on the ranch have been there working on the ranch.
Q. Okay.
11

A. And didn't live in town, didn't have more - how do I say it? They get
their health insurance paid for. Reed helped me go through that.
TT2, pp. 76-77. Over objections from Respondent's counsel, Petitioner's counsel then
attempted to use the purported transcript of said deposition to impeach or challenge such
statements. However, the purported transcript was never introduced into evidence, see
id,, p. 79, lines 19-22, was not used for any other evidentiary purpose except to
purportedly refresh Petitioner's recollection of what she said during that deposition, and,
in any event, procured no other relevant testimony. Instead, Bernice was simply asked to
read the following from the purported deposition transcript:
Q. Please read that part.
A. "Why was there a decision to split up - to have your daughters and Dean
receive or deal with the Cache County property and then you had your
other three boys remain in the Park Valley Property? Why was that
decision made? Well, it just seemed the thing to do. They grew up
there. These kids were in town. It was an easier way to separate it. Do
you feel that it was an equalized separation for your children? You
have several factors - you have to take several factors into
consideration." You said, "Okay. Tell me about those facts. These kids
that live in town probably are not inheriting , will not inherit, as much
as my sons that work on the ranch. They live and work where they
receive benefits. So that just seemed to be an easier way to do it."
Q. If I may approach, Your Honor, there's another portion I'd like her to
read.
[Court]. All right. Well, before you have her read another part, are you
going to ask her if that refreshes her memory as to that first part? I
don't want to get too many pages going here.
Q. Do you recall making that statement?

12

A. Yes.
Q. And that refreshes your memory about what was said earlier in April,
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you...
M a t pp. 80-81.
Solely on the basis of the foregoing, the district court determined that Bernice did
not intend to transfer the Subject Properties as a gift, but as earnings of some sort. That
ruling simply cannot be sustained. It is, at best, an inference made from the foregoing
statements. However, these statements do not support such a finding; they do not state
that Bernice intended to transfer the Subject Properties as anything other than a gift.
Whatever her personal reasons were for making the gift, the direct, undisputed testimony
is that such a gift was, in fact, made. See 38 Am Jur 2d Gifts, § 18 ("The donor's
motivation for making the gift, or the wisdom of making it, is irrelevant to the question of
whether he or she possessed the requisite donative intent."). Accordingly, the district
court's determination that the Subject Properties were marital property because they
should be viewed as "earnings" is not supported by the record and should be reversed.
Petitioner seems to argue that, even if this is true, the district court's ruling should
be sustained because the Subject Properties were converted in some manner from
Petitioner's separate property to marital property. However, there are no findings, and no
evidence to support this conclusion.
13

As noted above, the district court entered what amounts to a "catch-all" conclusion
that states the Subject Properties "were either (a) not gifts but entitlements earned during
the marriage, or (b) acquired or enhanced through the joint efforts of both Petitioner and
Respondent, or © have been commingled." R. 1355. Conclusions (b) and © are not
supported with any findings by the Court. This is because there is no evidence or factual
findings to support such a conclusion.
A district court's failure "to make findings on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment." Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The findings must show "that the court's
judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence," and
"should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Id. (internal
quotations and citation omitted). No findings were made by the trial court to support the
conclusion that the Subject Properties were "acquired or enhanced through the joint
efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent," R. 1355, and this conclusion in no way flows
"logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078.
It is telling that, in regard to the argument that record support exists for the
conclusion that the property was enhanced through "joint efforts," Petitioner relies almost
exclusively on an affidavit she filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. See

14

Brief of Appellee, pp. 16-18 and Addendum 1. This affidavit is not part of the trial
record. Petitioner's testimony at trial makes no reference to the assertions set forth in the
affidavit. Accordingly, these statements could not form a basis for the district court's
determination. See Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, Tf 11, 51 P.3d 724 ("in order to
properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." (emphasis added)).
Thus, the only testimony upon which Petitioner relies for the proposition that she
contributed to or enhanced the Subject Properties is the following:
Q. So during the time that you lived in Park Valley what was a typical what was the typical daily routine, or even yearly routine, as far as the
ranch operation and whatnot?
A. Alan was gone a lot. They had cows all over the place. Up in Logan
Canyon and in Idaho. We've had some in Nevada and Wyoming and
Colorado and he'd have to go with the cows there. He was gone a lot.
In fact, there was a few years there that I added it up and he was only
home five months of the year.

Q. And you indicated he was gone quite a bit?
A. He was.
Q. Okay. So who took care of the household issues?
A. I did
Q. The children and whatnot?
A. I did.
15

Q. Okay.
A. I would even have laundry sent home on a semi and I had [sic] go up
and meet the semi and get his laundry and bring it home and wash and
dry it as fast as I could before the next semi came through with the next
load that they were sending from Logan, then send them clean clothes
back to him.
Q. And this was for - where was he in Logan?
A. Up Logan Canyon gathering calves in the fall.
Q. Okay. So you would indicate to the court that you assumed most of the
domestic responsibilities during your marriage because he was
working?
A. Yes.
TT1, p. 12, lines 15-23; p. 76, lines 6-23.
There is no dispute that Petitioner took care of the domestic responsibilities related
to the household. However, there is no evidence that could support the district court's
conclusion that the Subject Properties were "acquired or enhanced through the joint
efforts of both Petitioner and Respondent." See Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304,
308 (Utah 1988) (holding that property inherited during marriage is properly awarded as
separate property unless "the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed
to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property") (emphasis added); Burt
v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("such property may appropriately be
considered part of the marital estate, subject to division, when the other spouse has by his
or her efforts augmented, maintained, or protected the inherited or donated property")
16

(emphasis added); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) ("defendant concedes
that he made no contribution toward the increase in value of the acreage in question and
that the income derived solely from the effects of inflation on land values"); Johnson v.
Johnson, 2007 UT App 329 (mem.) ("We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments that
his purported efforts - including doing some tile work in the home and 'supervising'
landscaping and home theater installation - were sufficient to obtain an equitable interest
in the home."); c.f. Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, If 24, 45 P.3d 176 (holding that
wife was entitled to share of corporate assets where "Wife not only managed the
household, but also grew the parties' marital properties."); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314,
1318 (wife had "performed bookkeeping and secretarial services without pay for the
corporation.").
Accordingly, the district court's conclusion regarding contribution to the Subject
Properties should be reversed.
Similarly, the district court's conclusion that the Subject Properties have in some
way been commingled is without basis and should be reversed. There is no finding by the
Court that could support such a conclusion, and the conclusion is without support in the
record. Accordingly, this conclusion should be reversed. See Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (holding that failure of the district court "to make findings
on all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.")

17

In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, this Court made the following observation,
particularly relevant here:
Even though defendant's inheritance is readily traceable and has not been
commingled, plaintiff argues that defendant's inherited funds have
substantially changed in form - they were received as cash but have become
stocks, bonds and real estate - and therefore they should be considered part
of the marital estate. Plaintiff relies on Mortensen, wherein the Court stated
that property which had lost its "identity through commingling or
exchanges" could properly be considered part of the marital estate. 760 P.2d
at 308. We disagree with plaintiffs reading of Mortensen. The thrust of
Mortensen is not whether the mere form of property has changed, but
whether it has lost its "identity" as separate property. Id. The separate
character of the defendant's inheritance has been maintained in segregated
accounts and portfolios and the home she purchased.... To accept plaintiffs
view of Mortensen would unreasonably discourage the prudent investment
of inherited funds. In order to preserve the property's separate character, the
donee or heir would be required to maintain the property in the same
physical form in which it was received, be it securities, real estate, or cash.
The law does not require such economic absurdity.
Id. at 1169 (emphasis added).
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record that could support the district
court's conclusion that the Subject Properties were, in any fashion, commingled with
marital assets. As set forth above, the Subject Properties were purchased with Bemice's
funds; Respondent did not contribute any money, let alone marital funds, to the same.
SeeTTl, pp. 71-73.
Petitioner points to various references in the transcript in an attempt to show some
record support for the district court's holding. However, Petitioner utterly fails to show
that marital assets were, in any way, commingled with the Subject Properties. Petitioner

18

cites TT2, p. 76 for the proposition that "the money Alan earned went into the Ranch
account.9' Brief of Appellee, p. 18. There is no such testimony on the page referenced.
Nevertheless, even if that statement had been made, it would not affect and has no
bearing on the disposition of the Subject Properties? The same is true for the remaining
statements cited by Petitioner - they are irrelevant to the issue of whether the Subject
Properties were, in some way, commingled with marital property. C.f. Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Even though Husband used
inherited funds to pay the down payment on the building, he used substantial marital
funds to maintain and augment that asset. We find no error in the court's determination
that the appreciated portion of the asset changed its character from a personal asset to a
marital asset.")
Accordingly, the district court's conclusion should be reversed. The district court
failed to make any factual finding in support of its conclusion that the Subject Properties
were marital due to non-described "commingling." Further, the facts of record are
certainly not "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of
the judgment." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078.
In sum, each of the three conclusions upon which the district court determined that
the Subject Properties were marital property should be reversed. Only one of these
3

Indeed, throughout her brief, Petitioner consistently conflates the identity of Bemice, the LLC,
the gifted Subject Properties, and Respondent himself, in order to show that "commingling"
occurred in some fashion or to some degree. However, there is no evidence that there was any
commingling of marital assets and the Subject Properties, the relevant issue herein.
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conclusions is based on any findings, and none of them are supported by the record. As a
result, Respondent requests that this Court reverse this determination and award the
Subject Properties to Respondent.
B.

PETITIONER'S CROSS-APPEAL.
I.

District Court Properly Awarded Respondent His Gifted
Interest in the LLC.

Petitioner argues that the district court erred when it determined that Respondent's
20.37% interest in Kunzler Ranch LLC, which asset was gifted to Respondent by Bernice,
was not a marital asset. Petitioner fails to show how or why the district court committed
error.
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are
not adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) states that the argument in the appellants brief
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the
issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not
preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and
parts of the record relied on.
Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9).
Petitioner's argument fails to comply with rule 24(a)(9). Appellant sets forth no
authorities or statutes to assist the Court and provides no analysis. Instead, Petitioner
merely asserts that, because the district court awarded the Subject Properties as marital
property, it should have made the same distribution with other gifted assets. Thus,
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Appellant has "impermissibly shifted the burden of analysis to the reviewing court in this
case." Smith v. Smith, 1999 UT App 370,«[[ 9, 995 P.2d 14.
Even if the Court determines the analysis is adequate under Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24(a)(9), Respondent fails to provide the Court with any reason to overturn the
district court's findings in regard to the LLC. To the contrary, Respondent provides the
very reason to affirm, when she states:
When forming the LLC and when purchasing the [Subject Properties], Alan
Kunzler's mother intended both to be gifts and/or inheritance and that
Allison Kunzler receive nothing.
Brief of Appellee, p. 20 (citing TT2, p. 73). Based on this and other facts, the district
court made specific findings related to Respondent's gifted interest in the LLC, see R.
1355-6, and properly awarded Respondent his separate property.

See Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) (holding trial court should "generally award
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during the marriage...to that
spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value.")
Respondent sets forth no facts that contradict the district court's decision, let alone
facts sufficient to overcome the requisite burden when challenging district court findings.
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 76, 100 P.3d 1177 ("In order to challenge a court's
factual findings, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even
when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." (internal quotations and
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citation omitted.))
Of course, Respondent shares Petitioner's concern set forth at page 20 of her brief:
The first problem with the trial court's reliance on these facts is that,
with the exception of the fact that the real property in Kunzler Ranch was
owned by Alan Kunzler's parents, the facts are identical to the facts upon
which the court relied in finding that the [Subject Properties] are marital
assets.
Brief of Appellee, p. 20. This fundamental inconsistency is, in essence, the basis for
Respondent's fervent challenge to the district court's disposition of the Subject
Properties; a problem that can be resolved by reversing the decision to divide the Subject
Properties.
II.

Petitioner Fails to Show District Court Error in the Manner of
Distribution of the Subject Properties.

Petitioner challenges the district court's failure to divide the Subject Property in a
manner not requested at trial.

Respondent is obviously of the view point that this

argument should be considered moot, due to the improper distribution of such assets in
the first instance.

For purposes of responding to the Cross-Appeal, Respondent argues

that Petitioner received precisely what she asked for - an interest in each of the Subject
Properties. She has set forth no basis for this Court to disrupt that remedy.
At trial, Petitioner's counsel argued, "[W]ith regard to the land that he holds
individually and the land held jointly, we would indicate that as a matter of law she's
entitled to a half-interest in that." TT2, p. 157, lines 24-25; p. 158, line 1. The district
court obliged this request, concluding that Petitioner was entitled to one half of
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Respondent's interest in each Subject Property. See R. 1349-1354. Petitioner now claims
that, rather than an ownership interest in these parcels, she is entitled to a monetary award
in lieu thereof. The problem in providing such a remedy is that Petitioner set forth no
evidence below of the value of the Subject Properties. Moreover, many of the Subject
Properties are owned by two or more individuals, which would add additional
complications to the determination of an alternate remedy.
Ultimately, Petitioner's argument fails because she sets forth no basis for
overturning this award or for remand. Thus, in the event that this Court affirms the
district court's decision to divide the Subject Properties, the remedy awarded should be
sustained.
III.

District Court Properly Denied Petitioner an Interest in the
LLC's Bulls.

Last, Petitioner argues that the district court erred when it found that certain bulls
were the property of the LLC, rather than marital properties subject to division. Once
again, Petitioner has failed to comply with rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and this argument should be summarily denied. In any event, Petitioner has
set forth no reason, whether legal or factual, for this Court to overturn the district court's
decision.
The sole finding on disposition of the bulls was as follows:
The Court heard evidence regarding bulls owned by Respondent.
Respondent testified that the sole reason for placing these bulls in his name
was so that he would receive benefits from the Angus Breeders Association
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in the form of magazines and newsletters. The Court finds there is some
evidence that the Respondent acquired ownership of some of the animals,
but it appears more likely the bulls are the property of Kunzler Ranch LLC.
R. 1346-47. Petitioner fails to give this Court any reason to overturn the district court's
determination, except to note that said decision is "diametrically opposed" to the district
court's determination regarding the Subject Properties.

Brief of Appellee, p. 24.

Accordingly, there is no basis to overturn the district court's factual finding on this point.
See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,176.
CONCLUSION
Respondent should have been awarded the separate property he was gifted during
the course of marriage. This includes the Subject Properties, which were paid for by
Respondent's mother, were given to him as a gift, and were not transmuted in some
fashion into marital property. Respondent has shown that the district court incorrectly
determined that the Subject Properties were marital property, and has shown that the
district court's conclusions in this regard have no evidentiary support in the record.
On the other hand, Petitioner has set forth no basis whatsoever to overturn the
district court's rulings relating to Respondent's gifted LLC interest, the disposition of the
LLC's bulls, or the manner in which the district court divided the Subject Properties.
Accordingly, Respondent respectfully submits that this Court should reverse the
district court's determination and division of the Subject Properties as marital property,
and should otherwise affirm.
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